Outbreak of Neisseria meningitidis capsular group W among scouts returning from the World Scout Jamboree, Japan, 2015 by Smith-Palmer, A. et al.
1www.eurosurveillance.org
Surveillance and outbreak report 
Outbreak of Neisseria meningitidis capsular group 
W among scouts returning from the World Scout 
Jamboree, Japan, 2015
A Smith-Palmer ¹ , K Oates ² , D Webster ³ , S Taylor ⁴ , KJ Scott ⁵ , G Smith ⁶ , B Parcell ³ , A Lindstrand ⁷ , A Wallensten ⁷ , H 
Fredlund ⁸ , M Widerström ⁹ , J McMenamin ¹ , on behalf of the IMT, investigation team in Sweden 10 
1. Health Protection Scotland, Glasgow, United Kingdom
2. NHS Highland, Inverness, United Kingdom
3. NHS Grampian, Aberdeen, United Kingdom
4. NHS Shetland, Lerwick, United Kingdom
5. Scottish Haemophilus, Legionella, Meningococcus and Pneumococcus Reference Laboratory, Glasgow, United Kingdom
6. International Health Regulations National Focal Point, Public Health England, London, United Kingdom
7. Public Health Agency of Sweden, Solna, Sweden
8. National Reference Laboratory for Pathogenic Neisseria, Örebro University, Örebro, Sweden
9. County Council Medical Officer, Stockholm, Sweden
10. Members are listed at the end of the article.
Correspondence: Alison Smith-Palmer (Alison.smith-Palmer@nhs.net)
Citation style for this article: 
Smith-Palmer A, Oates K, Webster D, Taylor S, Scott KJ, Smith G, Parcell B, Lindstrand A, Wallensten A, Fredlund H, Widerström M, McMenamin J, on behalf of the 
IMT, investigation team in Sweden. Outbreak of Neisseria meningitidis capsular group W among scouts returning from the World Scout Jamboree, Japan, 2015. Euro 
Surveill. 2016;21(45):pii=30392. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2016.21.45.303922 
Article submitted on 09 September 2015 / accepted on 04 January 2016 / published on 10 November 2016
The 23rd World Scout Jamboree was held in Japan 
from 28 July to 8 August 2015 and was attended by 
over 33,000 scouts from 162 countries. An outbreak of 
invasive meningococcal disease capsular group W was 
investigated among participants, with four confirmed 
cases identified in Scotland, who were all associated 
with one particular scout unit, and two confirmed 
cases in Sweden; molecular testing showed the same 
strain to be responsible for illness in both countries. 
The report describes the public health action taken 
to prevent further cases and the different decisions 
reached with respect to how wide to extend the offer 
of chemoprophylaxis in the two countries; in Scotland, 
chemoprophylaxis was offered to the unit of 40 partic-
ipants to which the four cases belonged and to other 
close contacts of cases, while in Sweden chemopro-
phylaxis was offered to all those returning from the 
Jamboree. The report also describes the international 
collaboration and communication required to inves-
tigate and manage such multinational outbreaks in a 
timely manner.
Introduction
Definitions of mass gatherings vary greatly, with some 
sources categorising any gathering of more than 1,000 
individuals as a mass gathering, while others require 
the attendance of as many as 25,000 people to qualify. 
Irrespective of the definition, mass gatherings repre-
sent large numbers of people attending an event that 
is focused at specific sites for a finite time [1]. Mass 
gatherings provide the potential for disseminated out-
breaks for a range of pathogens, especially respiratory 
and gastrointestinal [2-4]. Although meningococcal 
outbreaks are rarely reported from mass gatherings, 
there have been previous examples. An outbreak of 
meningococcal capsular group C was observed with 
11 linked cases following a youth football tournament 
held in Belgium in 1997 [5]. The Hajj pilgrimages in 
2000 and 2001 were associated with outbreaks of 
meningococcal capsular group W (MenW) [6], with a 
high attack rate among pilgrims and their household 
contacts [7]. Among those affected by the outbreak 
strain in England and Wales, the case fatality ratio 
(CFR) was 20%, significantly higher than the CFR of 9% 
for all other culture-confirmed cases of meningococcal 
disease reported in England and Wales between 1995 
and 2000 [8]. In response to the outbreak in 2000, 
the United Kingdom (UK) Department of Health recom-
mended MenACWY vaccine for those attending the Hajj 
[8].
The 23rd World Scout Jamboree was held in Yamaguchi 
City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan from 28 July to 8 
August 2015 and was attended by over 33,000 scouts 
from 162 countries. This included 160 scouts and 108 
adults from Scotland who were either leaders or part 
of the international support staff. The scouts attend-
ing from Scotland comprised five distinct units, one of 
which was the North of Scotland unit, with 36 scouts 
and four adult leaders, 60% of whom were male (16 
females and 24 males). The mean age of the scouts in 
this unit was 16.4 years (range 15–17 years).
On 12 August 2015, Health Protection Scotland was 
informed by a Health Protection Team in the North of 
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Scotland of a laboratory-confirmed case of invasive 
meningococcal disease in a scout belonging to the 
North of Scotland unit who had attended the 23rd 
World Scout Jamboree.
Epidemiological investigation
The epidemiological investigation carried out is illus-
trated in the Figure.
CSF: cerebrospinal fluid; EEA: European Economic 
Area; EU: European Union; EWRS: European Early 
Warning and Response System; IHR NFP: International 
Health Regulations National Focal Point; ref lab: refer-
ence laboratory; UK: United Kingdom.
Public health action in the United Kingdom
Following the identification of the first laboratory-con-
firmed case (12 August), an alert was sent via email 
to all Health Protection Teams in Scotland to raise 
awareness, an information letter emailed to all scouts 
and leaders in the North of Scotland unit and infor-
mation passed to the authorities in Japan via the UK 
Figure 1
Timeline for confirmed cases of meningococcal infection among scouts returning from the World Scout Jamboree, Scotland 
and Sweden, 28 July to 29 August 2015 (n=6)
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International Health Regulations National Focal Point 
(IHR NFP), Public Health England. The public health 
response was managed according to the UK meningo-
coccal guidance [9].
The first Incident Management Team (IMT) met on 13 
August with representatives from the North of Scotland 
National Health Service (NHS) Boards Health Protection 
Teams, microbiology, infectious diseases, Scottish 
Government and Health Protection Scotland. Five sub-
sequent IMTs were held with additional representation 
from Public Health England and Public Health Agency 
Northern Ireland.
Following the identification on 13 August of the sec-
ond laboratory-confirmed case and the identification 
of four other possible cases among scouts from the 
North of Scotland unit a risk assessment was under-
taken. The North of Scotland unit appeared to be a self-
contained unit within the UK contingent travelling to 
and from the Jamboree. Furthermore, their tent accom-
modation at the site was not adjacent to the other UK 
scout units. Chemoprophylaxis with ciprofloxacin and 
MenACWY conjugate vaccine was then offered to all 
scouts and leaders in the North of Scotland unit in 
addition to other close contacts of the two confirmed 
cases. The decision to recommend MenACWY vaccine 
was based on the results of preliminary antigen detec-
tion tests from the local hospital laboratory for case 
one. All individuals received chemoprophylaxis, and 
were offered vaccination, by the end of 14 August and 
18 August, respectively. Interviews conducted with 
these two cases did not initially identify any close con-
tacts outside the North of Scotland unit (even for their 
return international flight) and the immediate house-
holds of the confirmed cases. However, a close contact 
of the first case in a scout unit in another area of the 
UK was subsequently identified on the evening of 13 
August, and received chemoprophylaxis that night and 
MenACWY vaccine on 14 August. On the evening of 13 
August an information letter was emailed to all scouts 
from Scotland who attended the Jamboree, providing 
information about the incident.
On 14 August, one of the four possible cases under 
investigation was confirmed to have invasive meningo-
coccal disease and a further two possible cases identi-
fied. This brought the total to three confirmed and five 
possible cases. In the absence of additional informa-
tion indicating joint activities with other scout groups 
from the Jamboree, the IMT reiterated their decision 
not to offer antibiotic prophylaxis to any of the other 
UK scouts. Following the identification of the third 
confirmed case, there was discussion as to whether 
MenACWY vaccine should be offered to all participants 
in the UK. A decision was made not to extend the offer 
of vaccination, based on no evidence of spread in the 
UK beyond the North of Scotland unit. Additional con-
siderations supporting this decision included the prac-
ticalities of providing timely immunisation to such a 
large cohort, and concerns about vaccine availability, 
since a MenACWY immunisation programme had just 
commenced phased introduction for all 14–18 year olds 
and new university entrants in the UK [10]. However, 
using contact details provided by Scouts UK, an infor-
mation letter outlining the situation and the action to 
take in the event of symptom development was emailed 
that day to the parents/guardians of all scouts, lead-
ers and international support staff who attended the 
Jamboree from across the UK (ca 4,000). The rationale 
for this letter was that all such individuals were within 
the incubation period for meningococcal disease, being 
within 7 days of return to the UK from the Jamboree. For 
those individuals with no email address or for whom 
an undeliverable or out-of-office email response was 
received, alternative contact details (phone and/or 
postal address) were provided to the Health Protection 
agencies of each UK country to allow further attempts 
to provide information about the incident.
On 17 August, a fourth case was confirmed in a close 
contact of one of the scouts from the North of Scotland 
Unit. That scout was not a case and had reported no 
close contact with any of the other three confirmed 
cases. Chemoprophylaxis and MenACWY vaccine was 
provided to the close contacts of the scout’s infected 
close contact, including re-issuing chemoprophylaxis 
to the scout, due to continuing contact with the infected 
close contact following initial chemoprophylaxis.
Confirmed cases had a range of presenting symptoms 
(Figure). It was observed that a number of cases had 
respiratory symptoms such as cough or sore throat. 
As a result it was decided that there should be a low 
threshold for treating possible cases who presented 
with respiratory symptoms.
None of the remaining five possible cases under inves-
tigation were confirmed as invasive meningococcal 
disease or, on further review, clinically considered to 
be a case of invasive meningococcal disease; one had 
a positive throat swab for group G streptococci, one a 
positive throat swab for rhinovirus/enterovirus (com-
bined test does not determine which is positive). All 
four confirmed cases made a rapid clinical recovery 
after admission to hospital and were discharged from 
hospital by 20 August.
A total of 53 individuals in Scotland and one outside 
Scotland received chemoprophylaxis and were offered 
vaccination.
Microbiological investigations in Scotland
Neisseria meningitidis isolates submitted to the 
Scottish Haemophilus, Legionella, Meningococcus 
and Pneumococcus Reference Laboratory (SHLMPRL) 
by regional diagnostic microbiology laboratories were 
characterised by standard phenotypic procedures (api 
NH (BioMérieux), Wellcogen N. meningitidis ACYW135 
latex reagent (Remel Europe Ltd.) and monovalent 
meningococcus agglutinating serum (Remel Europe 
Ltd.)). Confirmation of N. meningitidis isolates and 
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detection of N. meningitidis DNA in clinical specimens 
was determined by ctrA PCR [11]. Genotypic capsular 
grouping was performed by siaD PCR [12] siaDW135 and 
siaDY primer and probe information was kindly pro-
vided by Dr Malcolm Guiver at the PHE Meningococcal 
Reference Unit (Manchester, UK). Multilocus sequence 
typing (MLST), PorA variable region (VR) sequencing 
and FetA VR sequencing were performed as outlined 
on the Neisseria sequence-typing website [13].
All four isolates from the confirmed cases were indis-
tinguishable by the phenotypic and molecular typing 
procedures outlined above. Based upon the EMGM-
recommended strain designation [14] this identified 
the N. meningitidis strain as W: P1.5,2,36-2: F1-1: ST-11 
(cc11).
Preliminary typing suggested that the W strain is 
indistinguishable from that responsible for the recent 
increase in MenW ST-11 disease in England and Wales 
since 2009 and more recent indications of increased 
disease in Scotland, with 15 isolates of MenW ST-11 
reported in Scotland in the first 45 weeks of 2015, 
accounting for 24% of all isolates over the time period, 
compared with just five, accounting for 7% of cases in 
2014 (SHLMPRL, data not shown) 
International aspects
On the evening of 13 August, a European Early Warning 
and Response System (EWRS) message was circulated 
to the National Focal Point contacts in the European 
Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA) about the 
meningococcal cases in Scotland.
On 14 August the Public Health Agency of Sweden, 
with the help of the Swedish Scout Organisation, dis-
tributed a letter to the returning scouts recommending 
them to seek healthcare promptly upon signs of men-
ingitis illness. On Sunday 16 August, the first Swedish 
case (case 5, Figure), a scout who had attended the 
Jamboree, was admitted to hospital with a clinical 
picture of meningitis and shock, with date of onset 
of first symptoms (not including shock) of 14 August. 
The case was treated in intensive care for 6 days. The 
case finally recovered well and was discharged on 28 
August. Gram-negative diplococci were initially found 
in CSF and N. meningitidis was verified by PCR the next 
day and subsequently by culture. The isolated strain 
was confirmed as capsular group W with the PorA 
profile 5,2,36-2, the same as identified from the four 
Scottish cases. This strain had also been previously 
isolated in Sweden in 2014 and 2015.
On the evening of 16 August the Public Health authori-
ties received reports of a second suspected case, a 
scout leader who became unwell on 13 August and was 
hospitalised on 15 August due to suspected septicae-
mia. The cases and their close contacts were managed 
according to the national guidance [15,16].
On the morning of 17 August, an urgent teleconference 
was convened by members of Communicable Disease 
Control and Prevention in Stockholm and Gothenburg, 
the Public Health Agency of Sweden and the National 
reference laboratory for Pathogenic Neisseria in 
Örebro, Sweden. During the one-hour meeting, two 
more suspected cases of meningococcal septicaemia 
were reported; one scout hospitalised in the South 
of Sweden and one scout hospitalised in Stockholm. 
This latter case was positive for N. meningitidis cap-
sular group W with PorA profile 5,2,36-2 in throat swab 
(result available on 26 August) and later confirmed by 
serology (case 6, Figure). Thus at that point in time the 
authorities in Sweden were aware of one confirmed 
and three suspected cases that appeared to be from 
different units and all hospitalised within 24 hours. The 
authorities were therefore unable to define a limited 
high-risk group among the scouts. Further, the cases 
had occurred within a high-risk setting for transmis-
sion with young people living in camp conditions and 
close social interaction. Hence a decision was taken 
to recommend ciprofloxacin prophylaxis to all 1,900 
scouts across Sweden. It was also decided when pos-
sible to obtain a throat swab to find out the carriage 
rate in such an outbreak, as this had not had been 
investigated in Sweden in modern times and there 
was now a unique opportunity to find out the carrier 
state of meningococci in teenagers in Sweden, a low-
incidence country for invasive meningococcal disease 
(0.5/100,000 inhabitants in 2014). These screening 
results will be published at a later date.
The offer of free prophylactic antibiotics in Sweden 
ended on 21 August, after which the risk of further 
cases due to transmission in Japan was deemed to be 
very unlikely. On the same day a questionnaire was 
administered to all participants in order to determine 
how many had taken up the offer, and how many had 
a throat swab taken, in addition to assessing general 
satisfaction with information and service delivery. Data 
from Sweden indicate that chemoprophylaxis uptake 
was around 80%, and that more than 90% were sat-
isfied with the information and instructions provided 
by the authorities. However, there were reports from 
healthcare providers in Sweden that the information 
about the intervention had not been received in all 
clinics.
Follow-up of the two confirmed Swedish cases identi-
fied that they belonged to the same scout unit. This 
information had not been available when the decision 
to offer chemoprophylaxis was made.
The first confirmed Swedish case was later identified 
as having attended a cultural day at the campsite on 2 
August. The cultural exchange day comprised an inter-
faith ceremony and a food festival in the afternoon dur-
ing which scouts cooked their own traditional dishes 
and invited scouts from other countries to taste and 
experience food and cultural differences among coun-
tries. Scouts from all countries were asked to walk 
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around the sub-camp to mingle and taste food from dif-
ferent countries, and during this event they visited the 
North of Scotland unit and tried their food and drink.
The organisers also held discotheques every third 
evening during the Jamboree. Anecdotal evidence also 
suggested extensive mixing between participants from 
many countries in keeping with the international nature 
of the meeting.
Examination of the campsite plan revealed that the 
North of Scotland unit had slept in tents in the western 
hub of the camp, as had the two confirmed cases from 
Sweden, although they were not immediately adjacent. 
The units closest to the North of Scotland unit were 
from the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, France, 
Luxembourg and Pakistan, none of which reported any 
cases
The two possible cases from Sweden were negative for 
N. meningitidis and subsequently discounted by the 
authorities as meningococcal disease.
Throughout the investigation, regular updates were 
issued via EWRS to EU/EEA countries, and informa-
tion exchanged, through the IHR NFP, with authorities 
in Japan. The EWRS alerts provided a rapid mechanism 
for both disseminating and collating information. In 
response to the EWRS, 20 countries reported that they 
had issued information to participants to raise aware-
ness of the signs and symptoms. None of these 20 
countries recommended antibiotics and no associated 
meningococcal cases were reported.
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in Japan 
requested that the Scout Association of Japan alert 
participants to be aware of the signs and symptoms of 
meningococcal disease and liaised with the Jamboree 
organisers. The Jamboree organiser provided infor-
mation to units who had stayed near the North of 
Scotland unit. There were no cases of invasive menin-
gococcal disease reported in Japan associated with the 
Jamboree.
Discussion
The North of Scotland scouts were not vaccinated 
against MenW before the Jamboree, since the UK rec-
ommendations on immunisation of travellers do not 
include Men ACWY vaccination in these circumstances. 
Likewise, neither of the Swedish cases was vaccinated. 
However, although vaccination is not recommended in 
Sweden before mass gathering events, a small number 
of Swedish scouts had been vaccinated before the trip.
 
In response to a recent UK increase in MenW disease, 
in February 2015 the UK advisory body on immu-
nisation the Joint Committee on Vaccination and 
Immunisation recommended a vaccination programme 
aimed at protecting adolescents against meningococ-
cal capsular groups ACW and Y strains. This was felt 
to be the best option to generate population-level 
protection since teenagers are in the age group with 
highest meningococcal carriage levels, and also an 
age group at increased risk of disease [17]. This rec-
ommendation was accepted by the UK Departments of 
Health. The immunisation programme in Scotland for 
14–18-year-olds started in August 2015 for young peo-
ple who had left school, whether attending full-time 
education or not, and others aged <  25 years starting 
university for the first time, and the school-based pro-
gramme began in January 2016 [10] This programme 
has replaced the earlier MenC immunisation offered as 
an adolescent booster in schools with a catch-up pro-
gramme. Therefore, in future years, adolescents from 
the UK attending Jamborees and similar mass-gather-
ing events should be protected against these capsu-
lar groups. As similar programmes are not currently 
in place in all other countries it will be for individual 
countries to consider whether there should be local 
recommendations for those attending such events.
The rapid communication of the identification of menin-
gococcal disease among participants of a dispersed 
mass gathering allowed public health authorities to 
target information to the international Scout Movement 
attendees of the Jamboree in individual countries. This 
timely dissemination led to rapid identification of other 
Scottish cases, and facilitated the identification of an 
epidemiological link to the Swedish case. In both the 
UK and Sweden the excellent electronic records and 
cooperation of scouting organisations greatly facili-
tated this process and allowed the rapid dissemination 
of information to participants. However it is recognised 
that for many mass gatherings where similar outbreaks 
may occur, for example music festivals, sports events 
and religious celebrations, such comprehensive con-
tact lists will not be available, making it extremely 
difficult to identify and contact potentially exposed 
individuals within the critical incubation window.
It was of interest that the IMT in Scotland and the rest 
of the UK arrived at different decisions than Sweden 
in terms of the extent of chemoprophylaxis offered. In 
Scotland the risk assessment for the cases, which were 
restricted to the North of Scotland, limited this offer to 
a small group, whereas in Sweden all 1,900 Jamboree 
attendees were offered chemoprophylaxis as it was 
not possible to identify a specific cohort at increased 
risk, as the information available on 17 August sug-
gested four cases under investigation hospitalised in 
the previous 24 hours from different units.
Uptake of chemoprophylaxis was high in both Scotland 
and Sweden and administered in a timely manner. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to determine if the 
mass distribution of prophylaxis prevented further 
cases. Comments from Sweden that not all healthcare 
providers had received the appropriate information 
highlight the importance of clear communication chan-
nels between public health institutions and healthcare 
systems, and the practical issues of conducting large 
exercises with tight timescales
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In a previous analysis of 129 UK MenW cases, none 
were contacts of another MenW case [18], making 
this the largest cluster (n = 6 confirmed cases; 4 in 
Scotland) in this current UK increase in MenW dis-
ease. Most individuals infected with N. meningitidis 
experience a period of asymptomatic carriage with no 
disease. A meta-analysis of carriage prevalence has 
shown increased carriage throughout childhood from 
4.5% in infants to a peak of 23.7% in 19 year-olds sub-
sequently decreasing in adulthood to 7.8% in 50 year-
olds [19], similar levels for 19–25 year-olds of 26.5% 
were reported from a UK carriage study in 2011, with 
capsular groups B and Y the most common at that time 
[20]. Although meningococcal carriage is potentially 
high in the participant age group, with carriage also 
depending on exposure to smoking, intimate kissing, 
pub-/club-type social settings and coincident respira-
tory tract infections of viral or bacterial origin [21], it is 
unclear why these cases developed invasive disease. 
Extensive social mixing associated with the Jamboree, 
preceding viral/bacterial infection and long-haul air 
travel could have been contributing factors.
Evidence from the UK increase of this sequence type 
(ST11), has suggested an often atypical clinical pres-
entation, with initially mild symptoms for some cases, 
and a case fatality rate of 12% [18], lower than that 
previously reported from the MenW outbreak associ-
ated with the Hajj [8]. The four confirmed cases from 
Scotland tended to have an atypical presentation, 
dominated by respiratory symptoms and did not have a 
severe course of disease, with none requiring intensive 
care admission. It is possible the latter may reflect early 
clinical presentation in response to the public health 
alert and prompt antibiotic intervention. Interestingly, 
in the previous analysis of UK MenW cases, such res-
piratory presentations were also associated with less 
severe disease [18]. Whole-genome sequencing is 
underway to further characterise the outbreak iso-
lates from Scotland and allow more detailed compari-
son with the endemic UK strain. These data may help 
explain apparent associations between clinical pres-
entation, severity and outcome. Continued enhanced 
surveillance in this area will be important.
Public health recommendation: decisions 
on the need for mass prophylaxis and 
vaccination
Decisions on the need for mass prophylaxis in large 
events like this need to be taken rapidly, even if only 
limited information is available initially. Each situ-
ation is likely to be different and will not be predict-
able. While UK guidance addresses such contingency, 
further work on development of generic decision algo-
rithms should be considered. If a decision is taken 
to recommend prophylaxis or vaccination it is impor-
tant that information can be delivered quickly, within 
hours to both those who may be at risk, and also to the 
healthcare system so they can arrange for delivery of 
the service in a timely manner.
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